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I INTRODUCTION 
Is global governance part of our past, of our present or of our future? Perhaps 
it is all of these — an unavoidable analytic framework, which we continue to 
apply as circumstances change around us with consequent changes in our 
perception of our political world. As David Kennedy has observed, ‘we are only 
just beginning to unravel the mystery of global governance. Simply mapping the 
modes of global power and identifying the channels and levers of influence 
remains an enormous sociological challenge’.1 Some versions of international 
law’s history of itself suggest that in pre-modern times a form of global 
governance indeed prevailed, namely the global domination of the Roman  
 
 
 
                                                 
 1 David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P 
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 37, 39. 
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Catholic Church or of the Holy Roman Empire.2 In the minds of  
English-educated writers at least, congenitally vague about European history, the 
Holy Roman Empire was more or less the same thing as the universal Church, 
and that imagined religious conglomerate purported to rule the globe from the 
days of Charlemagne until 1648. In that remarkable year, so the story goes, 
global governance was transformed. No more Papal string-pulling: instead, the 
plural sovereignty of local monarchs, each ensconced in his ‘nation-state’, 
getting on with the business of delegated sovereignty. For the outcome of the 
Westphalia settlement, as perceived with the special hindsight of the 
international lawyer, was no less than an evolutionary leap in global governance. 
With the same hindsight, the special form taken by the Reformation in England 
in the century before Westphalia is seen as a remarkable anticipation of this new 
world of Princes. The nation-state with its autocratic but circumscribed 
sovereignty, for all its faults and limitations, prepared the way for the popular 
sovereignty of liberal democracy and for free trade. Thus global governance both 
in ‘bad’ (Papal) and ‘good’ (Westphalian) variants is central to our past. 
In the present, globalisation, however parsed, implies global governance in 
some form or another. The United Nations system itself is some kind of global 
governance, as is the matrix of quasi-universal agreements on human rights and 
on humanitarian law. The network of surveillance orchestrated by the  
Anglo-Saxon powers (the ‘Five Eyes’) could be said to be a form of global 
regulation, if not governance. The same could be said for the effects of the 
internet, for the market and lifestyle manipulations of multinationals and so on. 
Thus the question of whether the future holds global governance needs to be 
contextualised both in terms of our imagining of possibilities, including our 
imagining of the past, and of whatever material realities we recognise as being 
‘out there’. Above all we need the intellectual resources with which to approach 
the many tangled questions posed by global governance. These include the role 
to be played by tradition-based forms of regulation and the articulation of a 
genuine legal pluralism;3 and the question of relationships between states in a 
world connected by wrongs as well as by rights.4 What is at stake is our 
collective stewardship of a fragile evolutionary project. 
‘Global governance’ is, then, a term of wide scope. Here I take it to mean, 
roughly, ‘the way the world is managed’. A Westphalian template or a 
hegemonic Papacy, a transcendental ‘law of nations’ or a centralised World 
Federation, would all be forms of management of the world’s affairs: competing 
explanatory and justificatory frameworks for geopolitics, each with its own 
balance of agency and structure, of expertise and tradition. ‘Anarchy’ might be 
                                                 
 2 This is the view that Patrick Capps critically characterises in the following passage:  
The emergence of a set of claims that natural law governed nations coincided with the demise 
of the authority of the Holy Roman Empire … Natural law, rather than the Pope or the 
Emperor, was now [around the mid sixteenth century] understood to govern international 
relations.  
  Patrick Capps, ‘Natural Law and the Law of Nations’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), 
Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) 
61, 61 (citations omitted). 
 3 John R Morss, ‘Good Global Governance: Custom, the Cosmopolitan and International 
Law’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Law in Context 59. 
 4 Helmut Philipp Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
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another alternative, not necessarily to be identified with the Westphalian.5 Yet 
another might be derived from an Hohfeldian analysis, an apt recognition of the 
centenary of the first announcement of Hohfeld’s scheme.6 As these last two 
examples illustrate, different models of world management — of global 
governance — differ greatly in terms of the constraints and the freedoms that are 
implicated in their particular ecological or systemic perspective.  
 Looked at in this way, regulation is an expression of governance. The 
relationship between governance and regulation might be thought of along  
the lines of the langue/parole difference in structural linguistics or the 
competence/performance distinction in the generative linguistics of Noam 
Chomsky.7 Governance is structural; regulation is performative. The global, 
regulative reach of the manipulators of markets, and of the state-sponsored 
surveillance industry, is in both cases more symptom than syndrome, more effect 
than cause. In thinking about the global, about governance, and about whatever 
is meant by the combination of these terms, we need to call upon the kind of 
technical and procedural expertise in which law excels. As Fleur Johns puts it, 
we should not necessarily ‘read down the capacities of international legal 
technicians as monolingual managerialism’.8 Our thinking about such issues as 
territoriality, the role played by communities in governance, and the role played 
by regulation in a globalised economy, is sufficiently sophisticated to make a 
contribution to the imagining of the global. Evolving debates over statehood in 
international law9 provide an illustration: effectiveness coupled with legitimacy 
seems to be taking centre stage. Legitimacy in turn is increasingly defined in 
terms of a democratic reading of self-determination. Political process is 
prioritised over the domination of delimited territory as such. Cross-border flows 
of regulation, capital, communications and ideology are the rule and not the 
exception, and dispute resolution across state boundaries is likewise 
unexceptional. The role of boundaries between states therefore needs some 
careful evaluation in relation to territoriality, neither over-playing nor  
under-playing their effects. 
The three books under review all seek, in diverse ways, to chart and to guide 
the future of international law. One (Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen) explores the 
multidimensional phenomenon of the extraterritorial, including the analysis of 
how and why our understandings of territoriality in law need to adapt to a 
changing world.10 Another (Trachtman) adopts a particular theoretical 
framework, an orthodox economic functionalism, in order to identify causative 
trends in international law and hence to predict its future growth and 
                                                 
 5 John R Morss, International Law as the Law of Collectives: Toward a Law of People 
(Ashgate, 2013) 133. 
 6 John R Morss, ‘The Legal Relations of Collectives: Belated Insights from Hohfeld’ (2009) 
22 Leiden Journal of International Law 289. 
 7 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 8. 
 8 Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 223. 
 9 Karen Knop, ‘Statehood: Territory, People, Government’ in James Crawford and Martti 
Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 95. 
 10 Günther Handl, Joachim Zekoll and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Beyond Territoriality: 
Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). 
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characteristics.11 The third (Weston and Bollier) sets out a program for the 
greening of governance, by which is meant the design and implementation of a 
sustainable, commons-based scheme for global governance.12 
II REGULATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The nature of territoriality continues to challenge our thinking. As the 
reference to the mythical Papal hegemony above reminds us, the international 
community continues to accept claims to international legal status of the 
contemporary vestigial manifestation of the former Papal States, claims which 
among other things, point to controlled territory as evidence of independence. Of 
course independence and sovereignty are moveable feasts. While Vatican City is 
an extreme example, it illustrates the general point that cross-border flows of 
regulation, capital, communications and ideology are the rule and not the 
exception. Physical barriers between states such as the oceans surrounding 
Australia, or the Berlin Wall, have certain effects which differ from the effects of 
a boundary such as that between Scotland and England. These effects include the 
construction of different senses of territory and different kinds of territoriality. 
Whatever may be meant by global governance, an articulated understanding of 
the changing role of territory in transnational legal regulation is going to be 
required. So is an understanding of the big picture of international regulation, 
and of the drivers of change in that system, standing back to some extent from 
the current disposition of territorial states.  
The editors of Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age 
of Globalization focus the attention of their contributors on extraterritoriality. 
Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen maintain a focus on legal senses of territoriality 
and of extraterritoriality, and on ways in which international legal discourse, 
both private and public, articulates extraterritoriality. This narrow focus is 
helpful because there is considerable diversity in those legal senses, a diversity 
that may well be obscured by a premature appeal to other disciplines or by the 
attempt to comprehensively contextualise. Private international law seems to be 
somewhat ahead of the public variety in the sophistication, or at least the 
technical complexity, of its analysis of territoriality. The chapters on intellectual 
property (by Alexander Peukert), on antitrust law (by Imelda Maher), on World 
Trade Organization (‘WTO’) law (by Friedl Weiss) and on international 
investment law (by Rainer Hofmann) open up the technicalities of territoriality in 
these different zones of legal activity across borders. International law knows 
many forms of territoriality or territorialities. 
It is therefore not a criticism of the Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen collection 
to observe that interdisciplinarity plays a limited role. Most of the contributors to 
this collection focus their attention on legal regulation, eschewing appeal to other 
disciplines. Peer Zumbansen is an exception. Zumbansen’s two contributions to 
the collection both propose that socio-legal studies, and the social sciences more 
generally, need to make a bigger contribution to the question of (legal) 
territoriality. In the scope afforded in these chapters Zumbansen does not make 
                                                 
 11 Joel P Trachtman, The Future of International Law: Global Government (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
 12 Burns H Weston and David Bollier, Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human 
Rights, and the Law of the Commons (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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great progress with these proposals. ‘Transnational legal pluralism’, as 
Zumbansen terms the approach he favours, is said to recognise the contestation 
and the erosion of boundaries between form and substance, and between public 
and private, in law.13 Above all, transnational legal pluralism is said to grasp the 
significance of the ‘contestation, de-construction [sic] and relativisation of the 
boundaries between law and non-law’.14 For Zumbansen these convergent 
processes are to be thought of in terms of ‘legal evolution’, with the emergence 
of a ‘transnational normative order’, for example, in the field of corporate 
governance.15 As Zumbansen notes somewhat in passing, the distinction between 
law and non-law is itself a kind of territorial question.16 But that question is even 
more challenging than Zumbansen here indicates. Johns’ Non-Legality in 
International Law is, among other things, an extended interrogation of that 
borderline: what might be called ‘beating the bounds’. For Johns, in a more 
rigorously deconstructivist mode than Zumbansen, non-legality lurks within the 
legal and legality lurks within the non-legal. 
This point brings us to the question of international law’s understanding of 
communities. In Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the 
Law of the Commons (‘Green Governance’), Burns Weston and David Bollier 
seek a future for sustainable global governance in grassroots developments 
where sovereignty is fragmented and fluid. For Weston and Bollier, imperatives 
of climate degradation, and other threats to the sustainability of human life on 
our planet, present us with the challenge of adjusting our whole approach to 
sovereignty and authority on both global and local scales.17 The substance of 
their program is centred around rights to a sustainable environment, such that 
those rights are attributable to future generations just as much as to the present 
world population, and even to the natural world itself. The vehicle is the 
commons. Thus Weston and Bollier call for ‘a reconceptualization of the human 
right to a clean and healthy environment achieved through new modes of 
commons-based governance’.18 Weston and Bollier do not here examine the 
conceptual underpinnings of such a right in relation to the plurality of its  
holders. Their proposed ‘Universal Covenant Affirming a Human Right to  
Commons- and Rights-Based Governance of Earth’s Natural Wealth and 
Resources’, which is couched in terms of the rights of ‘natural persons’, is 
sufficiently ambitious as it stands.19 Yet this ‘ontological’ exercise might be of 
importance.20 The role of rights of communities or of populations might play a 
useful part in articulating the entitlements and protections that Weston and 
Bollier are advocating. 
                                                 
 13 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global 
Governance and Legal Pluralism’ in Günther Handl, Joachim Zekoll and Peer Zumbansen 
(eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 53, 56. 
 14 Ibid 67 (emphasis altered). 
 15 Ibid 57–8. 
 16 Ibid. 
 17 Weston and Bollier, above n 12, 77–9. 
 18 Ibid 28 (emphasis altered). 
 19 Ibid 269. 
 20 Ibid 171. 
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Concrete proposals are offered by Weston and Bollier for the coordination of 
international efforts aimed at conserving natural resources and enabling 
sustainable enjoyment of resources by the public at large, as against the 
exploitation of resources by private capital. Regimes already in place for access 
to and protection of the Antarctic, the deep seabed and the Moon/outer space, are 
examples of ways of managing collective resources in a collective manner, 
honouring and operationalising the rhetoric of the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’.21 A ‘new architecture of law and policy’22 would involve a ‘Triarchy’ 
of State, Market and Commons.23 For example, private companies would need to 
take environmental impact into account much more rigorously than at present, 
and would be required to consult with appropriate ‘commons’ such as 
organisations responsible for community-managed resources. Empowerment of 
the commons might be thought of as a 21
st
 century, post-Communist echo of the 
‘all power to the Soviets’ by which workers’ control of the means of production 
was to be implemented in the heady, early days of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. There is in some ways a similar celebration of the legitimacy and the 
responsibility of the local community, one which forges a conceptual alliance 
with a deregulatory libertarianism that is less unfamiliar in the United States than 
is revolutionary socialism. Libertarianism in the fundamentalist form of anarchy 
also has its contemporary proponents24 and in some ways Chartier’s root and 
branch philosophical attack on the state complements the Weston and Bollier 
argument. 
Somewhat related to this point, there is on occasion in Weston and Bollier a 
slightly sentimental or populist attitude to the commoners’ worldview25 and its 
attachment to territory. This attitude could perhaps be balanced with reference to 
the dark side of community. A footnote in Green Governance on surfers’ 
collective control of surfing resources on Oahu26 refers to locals’ allocation of 
resources (the waves) and punishing breaches of respect (for local residents and 
the waves). This example is aptly used by the authors to illustrate the diversity 
and particularity of the commons. But surely it is also open to critique as an 
example of ethnocentrism and of collective greed. To the extent that the Weston 
and Bollier commons is characterised by deference to traditional practices and by 
claims to authenticity of affiliation, it seems regressive at least from a 
cosmopolitan perspective. 
International law is part of the solution for Weston and Bollier, since it 
already recognises a variety of relevant forms of entitlement for citizens and of 
obligations on behalf of states and corporations. Customary international law and 
international conventions both contribute to their toolkit of global regulation. A 
key regulatory role in the development of Green Governance is to be played by 
what Weston and Bollier call ‘Vernacular Law’.27 Vernacular Law is informal 
                                                 
 21 Ibid 216–19. 
 22 Ibid 179. 
 23 Ibid 195. 
 24 Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 25 Weston and Bollier, above n 12, 108. 
 26 Ibid 158 n 5. 
 27 Ibid 177. 
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and maintained by sociocultural processes and is by its nature a communal 
matter. It includes customary law in a general sense although the role of 
customary international law as such is not spelled out. But international law is 
also part of the problem. Except for its highly specialised, state-centred 
recognition of customary international law, it marginalises customary law more 
generally, and is apparently reluctant to recognise as justiciable so many of the 
concerns of indigenous peoples and other communities who suffer at the hands 
of residual colonialism or transnational capital. For Weston and Bollier, 
international law is an instrument that can be directed toward a variety of 
purposes, and the purposes or values are more important than the instrument. 
Green Governance is unapologetically political and communitarian. Consistent 
with this, Weston and Bollier are critical of ‘the impersonal, transactional,  
self-servingly rational, money-based models typically fostered by property rights 
and market exchange’.28 These are approaches that brought us to the global 
financial crisis and are of little help as we try to move forward. Thus they 
advocate that attention be paid to a wide range of economic models or 
paradigms, including approaches that attempt to break free from Enlightenment 
assumptions. ‘Commons models generally embody a different type of social 
order’29 than the above money-based models. But while Weston and Bollier 
gesture toward a communitarian account of international regulation, some of the 
communities they discuss are described in terms of voluntaristic individuals. In 
the context of communities in cyberspace, the Green Governance vision is an 
expressly liberal one; reference is made to ‘[s]elf-selecting individuals who come 
together on open platforms’.30 
Weston and Bollier thus adopt an eclectic approach, but eclecticism has its 
price. Joel Trachtman is much more disciplined, if that is the correct contrast. 
Trachtman strongly advocates an economic paradigm for international relations 
according to which states attempt to realise their preferences, and these 
preferences are seen to derive directly from the aggregated preferences of their 
individual citizens. Entertaining the hypothesis that a state ‘is behaving like an 
individual’, Trachtman observes that the state ‘would maximize its expected 
utility by a cost-benefit analysis’ and that states’ motivations sometimes gives 
rise to cooperation.31 According to Trachtman, ‘we might simply say that we 
seek efficiency in horizontal allocation of authority among states’.32 International 
law for Trachtman is therefore secondary to economic processes. For Trachtman, 
societies consist of individuals and the characteristics of societies are aggregates 
of the characteristics of those individuals. Global government — Trachtman 
eschews the term ‘governance’ as being too vague — is to be thought of in 
‘welfarist’ terms according to which ‘citizens … would determine to utilize 
international legal cooperation in order to improve their welfare’.33 Thus 
Trachtman’s liberalism is express, and this transparency of intellectual 
commitment is a virtue of his book. Trachtman’s is a ‘policy-exchange 
                                                 
 28 Ibid 15–16. 
 29 Ibid 15. 
 30 Ibid 17. 
 31 Trachtman, above n 11, 264. 
 32 Ibid 221. 
 33 Ibid 17. 
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contractual theory of international law’.34 Trachtman writes that ‘constitutional 
economics does not accept preemptive values such as human rights, 
environmental protection, or wealth maximization’35 except in so far as these are 
embodied in individual preferences. The approach is an attempt at a rigorously 
individualistic analysis, of ‘rational individuals seeking to maximize utility’.36 
State-individuals, or natural-person-individuals, undertake rational calculation in 
order to carry forward their interests. This line of argument is of course a 
venerable one, and whether the reader is an adherent of this view, a sceptic or 
even an opponent who considers it invidious, it is helpful to have the argument 
rehearsed. Any reader in either the second or third of these camps would wish for 
more detail in the foundations of the argument than is generally supplied by 
Trachtman in this book. For example, while much of Trachtman’s emphasis is on 
cooperation, cooperation is thought of as a strategic outcome designed to 
maximise objectives which are, at root, competitive.37 The Mutually Assured 
Destruction of the Cold War era’s deterrence policies were presumably 
cooperative in that sense. But this seems an incomplete analysis. Additionally, 
the under-theorised treatment of states as if they are kinds of individual, 
interacting with each other in ways that individual persons do, impacts on the 
plausibility of Trachtman’s claims. 
Trachtman’s methodological colours are thus nailed to the mast with as much 
zeal as are the activist colours of Weston and Bollier. While Trachtman’s 
individualism is in some ways in direct conflict with the communitarianism of 
Weston and Bollier, the two projects are not diametrically opposed on all points. 
It would be possible to employ Trachtman’s approach, or at least some variant of 
it, in the service of a political program such as that of Weston and Bollier. A 
cost-benefit analysis, based on human welfare, might well come down in favour 
of a sustainable planet rather than one that is rapidly exhausted of its potential to 
sustain human life (cf Weston and Bollier’s ‘more holistic, long-term cost 
accounting of our uses of Nature’38). Trachtman quotes with approval 
Friedmann’s 1964 account of ‘the growing structure of international organization 
and the pursuit of common human interests’.39 There is a danger of begging the 
question over the concept of ‘human welfare’ — its definition requiring an 
ideological choice — yet it seems possible to treat ‘common human interests’ in 
a manner that is not technical in the sense of economics and yet retains some 
precision, for example as including survival, again in alliance with Weston and 
Bollier. 
III THE PRODUCTION OF REGULATION 
Regulation is a theme for all three books being considered in this review but 
is perhaps an especial focus of Trachtman. For Trachtman regulation is 
fundamentally cooperative, arising from the reciprocal meeting of needs by free 
                                                 
 34 Ibid 64. 
 35 Ibid 262. 
 36 Ibid 262. 
 37 Ibid 264. 
 38 Weston and Bollier, above n 12, 14. 
 39 Trachtman, above n 11, 1 (emphasis added by Trachtman), quoting Wolfgang Friedmann, 
The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens, 1964) xiii. 
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agents: a market of interests. Trachtman describes the need for cooperation and 
for international agreements, situations in which cooperation becomes desirable. 
There can be said to be ‘extensive needs for greater international legal 
cooperation in order to cope with future opportunities and challenges’.40 
Similarly, there are for Trachtman ‘important reasons for international 
cooperation’ in the area of ‘cyberterrorism’ threats;41 and the reasons are at least 
as cogent for international cooperation over climate change, food security and so 
on. Trachtman is thus sanguine, almost Panglossian, about the future of 
international law: ‘as international law grows, it grows stronger. Furthermore, as 
it grows stronger it will be more useful for a wider range of tasks, causing the 
scope of international law to become more extensive’.42 More generally: 
as the frequency, intensity, and cumulation of … instances of cooperation 
increase, it is also to be expected that economies of scale and scope, arising from 
a number of sources, would suggest some degree of movement toward coherence. 
With increasing substantive interactions brought about by globalization, states 
would naturally find it useful to coordinate on issues of governing rules, 
regulatory cooperation, and regulatory competition. With increasing instances of 
coordination, states would naturally find it useful to ensure that the interactions 
among diverse rules is sorted out in a productive fashion.43 
Clearly, however, cooperation does not happen just because it is desirable, 
otherwise the project of Weston and Bollier, for example, would not be needed: 
we would not have got ourselves into this mess (both ecological and economic) 
in the first place. Good reasons or ‘needs’ do not seem to have been enough in 
the past for coordinated global action by governments. It is therefore not clear 
how much explanatory weight can be placed on the kind of analysis that 
Trachtman is carrying out here. So the Green Governance project among other 
virtues might be said to expose some of the gaps, or at least current limitations, 
in our available theoretical frameworks. Trachtman may be correct to predict 
such developments as the ‘increasing democratization or accountability of 
governments’.44 Elsewhere in Trachtman there is more nuance on democracy’s 
relationship with globalisation but from time to time trends such as this are 
discerned in terms that seem simplistic. Thus ‘sovereigns will be understood as 
trustee governments, holding power only insofar as they are servants of the 
people’.45 This reference to trusteeship is important: the work of Evan Criddle 
and Evan Fox-Decent on so-called peremptory norms of international law46 has 
demonstrated the significance of the notion of a fiduciary relationship in our 
thinking about global governance. But Trachtman does not seem to wish to 
clothe these bones in flesh. It is therefore difficult to evaluate Trachtman’s nod in 
the direction of a Weston and Bollier approach when he suggests that  
                                                 
 40 Trachtman, above n 11, 21. 
 41 Ibid 117. 
 42 Ibid 56. 
 43 Ibid 222. 
 44 Ibid 4. 
 45 Ibid 83. 
 46 Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, ‘A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens’ (2009) 34 Yale 
Journal of International Law 331. 
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in order to serve the people best, there will be situations in which [the trustee 
government] must give up authority … to allocate authority to the social 
organization best suited to exercise authority in the particular context. This can be 
expected to result in more international law.47  
Trachtman’s analysis is, to put it kindly, underdeveloped here. 
Trachtman describes his methodology as functionalist, and he has a specific 
tradition in mind in this connection.48 David Mitrany explored the nature of 
international organisations and international government, on the basis of posited 
national preferences and the bureaucratic consequences of states’ attempts to 
efficiently achieve those preferences.49 However Trachtman’s approach is 
functionalist in a somewhat wider sense also. Functionalist explanation is 
frequently to be encountered in references to the ‘natural’, and both Weston and 
Bollier, and Trachtman, give us examples. For Weston and Bollier, biological or 
evolutionary underpinnings of cooperation and competition are said to be 
illuminating.50 In Trachtman, the suggestion is made that quasi-natural processes 
are repeating themselves, displaying the same developmental pattern at the 
international level as supposedly on the municipal: ‘establishing basic property 
rights and rules of security first and turning to creation of public good and 
regulatory purposes later’.51 The remark is introductory and too much weight 
should not be placed on it; yet it is characteristic of Trachtman’s approach, and 
the later description of fragmentation as ‘a developmental problem of the 
international governmental system’52 is in the same vein. All is for the best, it 
seems, as a predictable process works its way out. 
Trachtman’s generalities and summary statements would benefit from 
unpacking. Of course Trachtman may feel that he has written enough about these 
matters elsewhere and does not wish to repeat himself in his latest book. But in 
some ways the unpacking is especially important when a functionalist analysis is 
being applied. There is a danger of circular argument and a kind of blandness in 
functionalist analysis as commentators such as Anthony Giddens have long ago 
observed.53 The above quotation from Trachtman (‘as international law grows, it 
grows stronger’) is an example. A similar style is to be found in the following: 
‘as the market of international relations becomes deeper and more efficient, it 
will increasingly be a part of a normal, and more stable, national equilibrium’.54 
Functionalism is notoriously difficult to avoid. In Handl’s introduction to the 
edited collection, it is asserted that ‘growing inter-dependence entailed the 
emergence of functional international organisations and institutions with which 
                                                 
 47 Trachtman, above n 11, 83. 
 48 Ibid 14. It should be observed that Joel Trachtman is by no means uncritical of the Mitrany-
Haas tradition of functionalism and neo-functionalism in international government, for 
example in its neglect of international law as such and in its tendency to teleological 
analysis of increasing integration in supranational affairs. See also David Mitrany, The 
Functional Theory of Politics (Martin Robertson, 1975). 
 49 David Mitrany, above n 48.  
 50 Weston and Bollier, above n 12, 132. 
 51 Trachtman, above n 11, 1. 
 52 Ibid 222. 
 53 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Polity Press, 1984). 
 54 Trachtman, above n 11, 43. 
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states began to share transnational legal authority’,55 which seems to say little. In 
a similar vein, elsewhere in Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen’s collection, the 
introduction to Weiss’s chapter on the WTO takes us from the supposed papal 
hegemony and Westphalia to the SS Lotus case56 in 20 lines, suggesting an 
evolutionary imperative shaping our ends.57 This superficiality is perhaps 
unavoidable in an introductory context such as that of Handl or of Weiss but 
more of a problem if it can be said to characterise Trachtman’s analyses. 
Observations such as ‘men and women have found it good to depart anarchy and 
establish constitutional rules in many contexts’58 give cause for concern in this 
respect. This kind of claim has all the vacuity of functionalist analysis; it says 
little more than that this purported state of affairs ‘works’, and that alternatives 
such as imagined precursor alternatives, do not. Similarly, Trachtman cites with 
approval Francis Fukuyama’s mundane observation that with environmental 
change and other challenges, ‘there is often a disjunction between existing 
institutions and present needs’.59 Yet Fukuyama himself goes on to say, 
somewhat more substantively, that those institutions ‘are supported by legions of 
entrenched stakeholders who oppose any fundamental change’.60 Any new 
analysis of broad trends in global regulation or governance must reach, if only 
speculatively, beyond the familiar. 
Trachtman’s style is straightforward and engaging, which may thus at times 
be at the expense of precision. Weston and Bollier think that we are globally in 
crisis, and they make a case for this claim. Trachtman’s introductory chapter is 
entitled ‘The Crisis in International Law’ but, unlike the former authors, it is not 
clear what Trachtman thinks the crisis is. He argues that international law is 
evolving, that it responds to changes in its environment and that it is a kind of 
marketplace; the tenor of which is to deflate the notion of crisis. It may be that 
by ‘crisis’ Trachtman is referring to the challenge presented by current 
international concerns over such matters as human rights, environmental 
degradation, cyberterrorism and so on — topics which he investigates in depth in 
later chapters of the book. These are pressing issues but Trachtman overstates his 
case by asserting that one hundred years ago ‘[t]here simply were few 
international concerns raised by these types of issues’.61 That is to say, what 
Trachtman thinks of as a classical ‘Grotian’ form of international law, setting out 
expectations for diplomatic interaction around war and peace and free trade, was 
in the past adequate and therefore was not exceeded. Again this statement is 
intended to be a pragmatic generalisation but it does seem unhelpfully sweeping. 
Significant political pressures arose in Great Britain, for example, nearly two 
                                                 
 55 Günther Handl, ‘Extra-Territoriality and Transnational Legal Authority’ in Günther Handl, 
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centuries ago in response to the perceived persecution of co-religionists by the 
Ottoman Empire.62 The Communist Manifesto63 was published not much later, 
still more than a century and a half ago, and without accepting its own hyperbole 
at full face value, its significance as an expression of internationalism can hardly 
be dismissed. Earlier than both, the American Revolution influenced the French 
event and both caused ripples across Europe and Asia.64 
IV THE CONSUMPTION OF REGULATION 
Trachtman’s summary view, while acknowledging the openness of the future 
of the global states system, somewhat overlooks the historically contingent and 
transient (as well as incomplete) nature of that system as a manifestation of a 
Grotian brand of regulation. Greater historical sensitivity would assist here. The 
observations of James Gordley in the Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen collection 
are apposite. Discussing the medieval jurists, Gordley argues that ‘explanations 
in terms [of] territorial sovereignty never solved the old problems’,65 that is to 
say, the problems of that era. Gordley’s point is that articulations on conflict of 
laws in medieval times were worked out absent a modern sense of territory or of 
territorial sovereignty. It is not surprising, Gordley thus argues, that such 
articulations make a poor fit with conflict of laws problems in a modern world if 
a so-called Westphalian territorial states system is presupposed for that world. 
On the other hand, to the extent that our contemporary times, and the times ahead 
that we can visualise, demand that we free ourselves of such a state-territorialist 
presupposition, the medievals’ formulations might be informative. While this 
proposal is not worked out in detail, there is a subtlety in Gordley’s analysis 
which would make a valuable contribution to the historical dimension of 
Trachtman’s project. It is in the Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen collection, again, 
that the most sophisticated (if exploratory) account of regulation is to be found. 
Larry Catá Backer’s chapter on ‘Governance without Government’ looks at 
statehood and territoriality from the perspective of multinational enterprises with 
their detachment from territoriality as traditionally understood. Backer considers 
the possibility that  
the idea of the state can morph from a territorially-privileged totalitarian ideal, 
understood in its sense of the state as the ultimate repository of all authority, to a 
social system expressed through territory and embedded in more complex  
co-ordinated governance.66  
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Strikingly, Backer observes that, ‘[n]o longer having a monopoly power to 
regulate enterprises, states are now understood as mere producers of an important 
good — regulation — that can be characterised as a cost of operations’.67 
This, for Backer, is an explanation for the phenomenon that corporate law 
‘seems strongly attached to the ideology of the state and state power’.68 Thus 
‘[c]orporations consume regulation in the same way that they consume labour, 
capital and other items necessary for their operations’.69 One is reminded of 
Herman Melville’s Bartleby, who the lawyer narrator tells us ‘seemed to gorge 
himself on my documents. There was no pause for digestion’.70 Feeding on 
regulation seems a more insightful commentary than the oft-heard cliché that 
firms above all value certainty so far as the law is concerned. As has been 
observed by others, certainty would stifle competition and enterprise in general, 
whereas the imperfect predictability that inevitably arises from regulation in the 
real world generates opportunities. One may cautiously employ a Darwinian 
metaphor at this point, by observing that natural selection works on relative 
fitness and not absolute fitness — an ‘edge’ so to speak. Controlled and 
delimited uncertainty in the regulation of business is its lifeblood. 
In his conclusion Backer indicates that Foucault’s 1970s account of the state 
and governmentality is of its time, and has been rendered obsolete, no less than 
Mussolini’s vitalist and organicist account of the state of the 1920s. In Backer’s 
words, ‘[g]lobalisation has begun to undo these pre-Twenty-first century 
verities’.71 Governance comes to be ‘organised as government without a  
state … [and] this governance necessarily reaches out beyond its borders into 
states and other governance entities’.72 Thus, instead of Foucault’s assertion of 
the ‘governmentalisation’ of the state, ‘what is important for our modernity is the 
governmentalisation of the non-state actors’.73 For Backer, ‘[t]his emerging 
governance framework to some extent displaces and supplements state power, in 
the sense of appropriating governance space beyond territory and projecting it 
back into territorially-defined competences’.74 International law’s Foucauldian 
scholars might give some attention to Backer’s necessarily brief remarks on 
Foucault,75 and to his exploration of a somewhat more Deleuzian vocabulary of 
speed, in provocatively suggesting that ‘“[e]scape velocity” from the orbit of the 
state’76 becomes a key parameter in the contemporary era. This innovative 
vocabulary is of service at the very least in offering us distance from the more 
familiar terminology of Westphalia, the Lotus and so on. But it also introduces a 
kind of materialism that legal theory should be in a position to take on board. 
Having expressed reservations above concerning Trachtman’s position, it should 
be acknowledged that Trachtman’s economics-based approach is apposite here. 
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Backer’s proposal that corporations can be said to ‘consume regulation’ can be 
connected with Trachtman’s analysis. Trachtman notes that the status of being a 
party to a human rights treaty (for example), and compliance or otherwise with 
the requirements of such a treaty, can be analysed in terms of supply and 
demand.77 Again, discretion and ‘incomplete contracts’78 are discussed by 
Trachtman. The discipline which Trachtman would wish to bring to bear on 
international law would certainly have ways of grappling with, and trying to 
render much more precise, the kinds of points made above concerning 
uncertainty in international business. Risking the Panglossian, elements of the 
diverse apparatus developed in each of these three volumes can be said to 
converse with, as well as to challenge, each other so that a kind of lumbering 
conceptual progress might be discerned in the ongoing debate on global justice 
and governance.79 The three books together are more than a sum of their parts: to 
use Thatcherian language, the ‘dry’ Trachtman is challenged by the ‘wet’ 
Weston and Bollier, and both lack the earthiness of Handl, Zekoll and 
Zumbansen. Collectively, we are globally governing. We are not a caretaker 
government: the buck stops here. 
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